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EUROPE’S DOUBLE ORIGIN: 
“THE GREEK” AND “THE 




In our paper we treat the Arendtian genealogy of Europe against its Heideggerian backdrop and also with 
regard to several key phenomenological commentaries, especially these of Reiner Schürmann, Jacques 
Taminiaux and Eliane Escoubas. Arendt often plays Greek against Roman politics insisting that the 
political is founded upon a unique type of experience, which is not that of truth, but of freedom perceived 
not as a means for political ends, but as being intrinsically political, which is for her a unique Roman 
achievement. What would such a discourse on Europe’s founding narratives, which are no doubt not 
only Greek and Roman, but also Christian and Enlightenment-based, have to contribute to the on-going 
European crisis? The phenomenological discourse on the origins of Europe shouldn’t be perceived as the 
reductive endeavor to identify a unique, unchanged, and ultimately exclusive principle determining the 
common European identity in terms of identity and difference or authenticity and inauthenticity, but in 
the terms of what Marc Crépon claims about Europe being the product of a dream, that is, the product of 
an infinitely renewable self-differentiation. 
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In his book Europe. La voix romaine (Brague 1992) the eminent French historian of Arabic 
and medieval philosophy Rémi Brague defended that today’s Europe should recognize the 
diversity of its heritages: it is not only Athens and Jerusalem – Hellenism and Judaism-
Christianity which have constituted its identity, but first and foremost Rome.1 For Brague, 
a historian of philosophy with a sound knowledge of phenomenology,2 latinitas more than 
romanitas is typical of what modern Europe has identified as its heritage (Brague 1992, pp. 
35-36). The phenomenological echoes of Brague’s questioning is more than evident in his 
explicit reference to Husserl’s crisis of the European sciences and to Heidegger’s critique 
of Western (European) metaphysics, when he introduces the dichotomy between Europe 
as a space (lieu) and Europe as a content (contenu), but also when he transcribes the initial 
question “qui sommes-nous?” into the question “que possédons-nous en propre?” (Brague 1992, 
pp. 32-33). Brague points out the Hellenocentrism of phenomenology, its depreciation of what 
strikes as derivative or inauthentic, last but not least, its silence as to what constitutes for 
him the third term between the two “creative” origins of Europe, that is the Greek and the 
Jewish-Christian (Brauge 1992, p. 4; see also Brauge 1993). Brague does justice, nevertheless, 
to a phenomenologist who is the only to differentiate herself from the phenomenological 
orthodoxy by recognizing the independence of Rome vis-à-vis Athens: Hannah Arendt (Brague 
1992, p. 45). 
Brague’s critique of Hellenocentrism in phenomenology does not, of course, strike us 
as paradoxical: along with the revival of a discourse on Europe – from E. Husserl and M. 
Heidegger to H. Arendt, J. Patočka, J. Derrida, J.-L. Nancy, M. Crepon, B. Waldenfelds among 
others – it is Europe’s “eccentric” identity which lies at the heart of this questioning.3 In 
what follows I will raise the question of Europe’s double, Greek and Roman, origin within 
Arendt’s European phenomenological genealogy. Arendt’s treatment of the “Roman answer” 
structured around the triangle of traditio-auctoritas-religio has emphasized the autonomy of the 
Roman origin with regard to its Greek predecessor in opposition to other leading European 
1  “Nous sommes des Romains, dirais-je. Et, en un sens, nous le sommes restés, après et malgré la révolution qui s’est 
produite dans le rapport avec le passé” (Brague 1991, p. 31). Brague alludes to Michel Serres’ raising of the question of 
the Roman foundation in his Rome. Le livre des foundations (1983). He criticizes, nevertheless, the absence of clarity in 
Serres’ argumentation with regard to the Roman foundation of Europe.
2  See for instance Brague 1984.




phenomenological discourses, such as those of Martin Heidegger and, to a certain extent, of 
Jan Patočka.
Hannah Arendt has reflected intensively on the difficult relation between the Greek and the 
Roman origin of Europe, especially with regard to the political heritage of modern Europe. 
The key issue here is philosophy’s relation to politics and it is in this light that she treats 
comparatively the Greek and the Roman experience of theoria and political praxis. It is, thus, 
worthwhile to elucidate the juxtaposition as well as the mutual penetration of the two 
experiences in light of Arendt’s key writings, such as The Human Condition, Between Past and 
Future and The Life of the Mind, but also in light of less known writings, such as her 1950s draft 
essay of an Introduction to Politics. 
In The Human Condition Arendt echoes Heidegger’s devaluation of the Latin transcription of 
Greek terms such as the “politikon” and man as a “zōon politikon”: these transcriptions have, 
in fact, led to a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of “the political” for the Greeks 
and its hasty identification with “the social” (Arendt 1983, p. 64). The radical misappropriation 
by the Romans was accompagned by a new equilibrium between the public (res publica) and 
the private (the family, the household), which witnessed, among others, the new function 
of the economy – the wealth as a driving social force – and of the gradual depreciation 
of the bios theoretikos. This evolution, which led to the “rise of the social”, shook the very 
foundations of the dichotomy between the public and the private and was further exacerbated 
by Christianity; it is in this form that it reached the modern world (Arendt 1983, p. 66). 
Arendt thematizes in detail what she designates as “the solution of the Greeks” in the central 
part of her book, where she deals with the theme of action as the highest form of activity 
lying beyond labour and work (Arendt 1983, p. 251). Here Arendt explicates the revelatory 
function of action and speech, which in the Greek world, served the exercise of an “agonistic” 
spirit; due to this conception of the political as intrinsically “agonistic” and situated in the 
in-between of people, the Greeks, contrary to the Romans, neither included the law in the 
originary space of the political nor considered it as an autonomous region of human action. 
Arendt’s account of the Greek pre-philosophical experience of speech and action exemplifies 
the polis as an essentially fragile community of action, as a “space of appearance”, which as 
such incorporated the activity of the legislator as a content of action only to the extent that he 
continued to act, thus not fixing the law in an immutable finished product.4 At the same time, 
the Greeks, once more contrary to the Romans, had no particular attachment to the polis as a 
territory or as a fatherland, they were not patriots, so to speak (Arendt 1983, pp. 253-254). 
Arendt’s questioning in The Human Condition is further deepened in The Life of the Mind and 
also in Between Past and Future, a collection of essays which stands as an intermediary between 
the two. In “What is authority?” Arendt explicates “the one political experience which 
brought authority as word, concept and reality into our history – the Roman experience of 
foundation”, that is the “conviction of the sacredness of foundation”, on the occasion of her 
treatment of today’s crisis of authority (Arendt 1967, p.p. 121, 136).5 Authority was clearly 
4  In this sense, Aristotle seems to be more adequate than Plato in his investigation into the nature of action in terms 
of energeia (Arendt 1983, p. 267). Secondary literature on The Human Condition illustrates is Arendt’s back and forth 
between two models of politics – the one being, the “agonistic”, that is, the Greek – and the other, the “associationist”, 
the Roman. In this respect, “agonistic” politics for Arendt would be the outcome of plurality, the models being 
Homeric heroes and Pericles in Athens’s golden age; on the other hand, “associationist” politics for her would be 
those related to publicity, to the opening up of a space constituted by the in-between of human agents (Disch 1994, pp. 
73-90).




not a constituent of the Greek public realm: a structural analogy for it would be the structure 
of the household, but also the political diagnoses and insights of Plato and Aristotle into 
the crisis of the Greek polis: “…[for them] the element of rule, as reflected in our present 
concept of authority so tremendously influenced by Platonic thinking, can be traced to a 
conflict between philosophy and politics, but not to specifically political experiences, that 
is, experiences immediately derived from the realm of human affairs…” (Arendt 1967, p. 113; 
also p. 116). The latter became possible only in Roman times, when the concept of authority 
in terms of rulers and ruled received a firm political foundation in terms of preserving the 
founding of the city of Rome: “The foundation of a new body politic [Rome] – to the Greeks an 
almost commonplace experience – became to the Romans the central, decisive, unrepeatable 
beginning of their whole history, a unique event” (Arendt 1967, p. 121).6 To this originary 
event are linked two more instances, those of religio – rendered as the quality of being tied 
to the past – and of traditio: “The notion of a spiritual tradition and of authority in matters of 
thought and ideas is here derived from the political realm and therefore essentially derivative 
– just as Plato’s conception of the role of reason and ideas in politics was derived from the 
philosophical realm and became derivative in the realm of human affairs” (Arendt 1967, p. 
124). Arendt’s powerful analysis of the “Roman trinity” of auctoritas-religio-traditio, as it has 
perpetuated its existence into the Christian Middle Ages, witnesses the twofold “continuity 
of the Roman spirit in the history of the West”, but also the impasses from the vain efforts to 
disrupt the continuity between these three factors which constitute an “unbroken tradition of 
Western civilization” (Arendt 1967, pp. 127-128). Enlightenment Europe has clearly threatened 
the undisrupted continuity of this triad. While referring to Montesquieu’s diagnosis of the loss 
of political authority Arendt observes: “In its broadest terms, one can describe this process 
as the breakdown of the old Roman trinity of religion, tradition, authority, whose innermost 
principle had survived the change of the Roman Republic into the Roman Empire, as it was 
to survive the change of the Roman Empire into the Holy Roman Empire; it was the Roman 
principle that now was falling to pieces before the onslaught of the modern age.” (Arendt 1963, 
p. 117).
Let us now move to the third instance in Arendt’s Athens/Rome dichotomy. In the second part 
of The Life of the Mind Arendt elaborates on what she designates as the “Greek answer”. What 
Arendt designates as the pre-philosophical assumptions of Greek philosophy corresponds 
to archaic thought but even more to archaic poetry, which contains an intact political core 
rendered explicit in the Greek term athanatizein: “What was involved, prior to the rise of 
philosophy, in the notion of a position outside the realm of human affairs, can best be clarified 
if we briefly examine the Greek notion of the function of poetry and the position of the bard. 
[…] To state this in conceptual language: The meaning of what actually happens and appears 
while it is happening is revealed when it has disappeared; remembrance, by which you make 
present to your mind what actually is absent and past, reveals the meaning in the form of 
a story” (Arendt 1981, pp. 131-132). Therefore, in the last presocratic philosophers, such as 
Parmenides, Being became another term for immortality, an event which gave rise to classical 
political tradition: “In politics, the capacity to begin something new is exhibited most clearly, she asserts, in the 
foundation of bodies politic. Foundation, like spontaneous action, is a kind of creation ex nihilo – a circumstance that 
poses thorny issues for the founders” (Schnell 2002, p. 465).
6  The Roman experience of foundation is, therefore, an experience of repetition, retrieval, and also of imitation: 
“Inherent in the Roman concept of foundation we find, strangely enough, the notion that not only all decisive 
political changes in the course of Roman history were reconstitutions, namely, reforms of the old institutions and 
the retrievance of the original act of foundation, but that even this first act had been already a re-establishment, as it 
were, a regeneration and restoration” (Arendt 1963, pp. 207-208).
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philosophy as such and philosophical conceptuality structured around the terms logos, nous, 
alētheuein.7 If pre-philosophical Greece was structured around athanatizein, thus, laying a 
political claim on the public realm, classical Greece (Athens), essentially in Plato, condensed 
its intellectual endeavour in the attitude of admiration (thaumazein) (Taminiaux 1992, pp. 
211-246). But this pursuit of contemplative philosophy jeopardized the pre-philosophical 
quest for immortality and made it succumb to the ideal of eternity, of eternal truth: “For this 
wonder is in no way connected with the quest for immortality; even in Aristotle’s famous 
interpretation of wonder as aporein […] there is no mention of athanatizein, the immortalizing 
activity we know from the Nicomachean Ethics and which indeed is entirely Platonic” (Arendt 
1981, pp. 141).8 Arendt comprehends thaumazein not in terms of confusion and perplexity, but 
as the affective disposition of admiration, as “admiring wonder”; it also links it to physis as 
the “invisible in the midst of the appearances”.9 In the transition from the classical Greek to 
the Roman conceptuality the philosophical language was impoverished – here Arendt echoes 
Heidegger’s thesis – as key philosophical terms, such as the term θεωρία, were deprived of 
their conceptual strengh; thus, in Lucretius: “the philosophical relevance of spectatorship 
is entirely lost – a loss that befell so many Greek notions when they fell into Roman hands” 
(Arendt 1981, pp. 140). Arendt qualifies the relationship between the “Greek” and the “Roman 
answer” as oppositional: “On the one hand, admiring wonder at the spectacle into which man 
is born and for whose appreciation he is so well equipped in mind and body; on the other, the 
awful extremity of having been thrown into a world whose hostility is overwhelming, where 
fear is predominant and from which man tries his utmost to escape” (Arendt 1981, p. 162). In 
fact, if the “Greek answer” is to be understood as “thought […] concerned with invisible things 
that are pointed to, nevertheless, by appearances”, the Roman answer has an entirely different 
starting point, which is intrinsically non-philosophical or at least indifferent to philosophy, 
condensed in the phrase “nihil admirari”: “thinking then arises out of the disintegration 
of reality and the resulting disunity of man and world, from which springs the need for 
another world, more harmonious and more meaningful” (Arendt 1981, p. 153). The shift in 
the understanding of theoria came out of the radical transposition of Greek conceptuality into 
something different, a shift which had a tremendous impact upon the fragile equilibrium 
between reason and will, thus favoring the will and at the same time turning philosophy into 
a techne, more precisely, into the highest possible form of technē, while the realm of politics 
became the only realm ascribed to authentic praxis: “Philosophy is called upon to compensate 
for the frustrations of politics, and, more generally, of life itself” (Arendt 1981, p. 160). 
Arendt’s treatment of Christian philosophy in Saint Augustine conceives of him as a Roman 
philosopher, an identity which she acknowledges as decisive for the whole Roman Catholic 
Church through medieval times, thus, drawing a straight line from Paul and Saint Augustine to 
Duns Scotus passing through Aquinas.10 
7  Here Arendt proposed an etymology of the term which resembles Heidegger’s in his Parmenides course (Martin 
Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 54). 
8  Cf. “The Concept of History” in: Arendt 1967, pp. 71-72. See Jeffrey A. Barash’s comment on the immortality/
eternity dichotomy in Arendt, where immortality in the early Greeks is essential political, pre-philosophical, whereas 
eternity fits the deal of theoretical truth (Barash 1996, pp. 262-263).
9  Plato’s answer, that is the answer of the classical Greek philosophy, is identical to what Heidegger designates under 
the term of metaphysics (Arendt 1981, p. 145).
10  “That the Roman Catholic Church, despite the decisive influx of Greek philosophy, remained so profoundly Roman 
was due in no small mesure to the strange coincidence that her first and most influential philosopher should also have 
been the first man of thought to draw his deepest inspiration from Latin sources and experiences. In Augustine, the 
striving for eternal life as the summum bonum and the interpretation of eternal death as the summum malum reached 
the highest level of articulation because he combined them with the new era’s discovery of an inward life” (Arendt 
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Arendt’s questioning on Europe’s double origin with regard to philosophy and politics have 
been the topic of several commentaries by phenomenologists such as Jacques Taminiaux, 
Eliane Escoubas, Reiner Schürmann and others, such as Barbara Cassin, most of the times in 
light of a comparison with Heidegger’s discourse on Europe.11 Barbara Cassin’s treatment of 
the Greek/Roman dichotomy in Arendt retrieves a common hermeneutic “topos” to the extent 
that it insists on opposing the two major hermeneutic paradigms – Heidegger’s and Arendt’s 
(Cassin 1990). Cassin opens up the space of her questioning by pointing out several critical 
points of convergence between Arendt’s and Heidegger’s approach to Europe’s tradition and 
modernity; first, their common concern for the dismantling of Western metaphysics, which 
for both of them is not a speculative issue, but an issue closely related to European and world-
history, and, as far as Arendt is concerned, to political history; second, their indisputable debt 
to Greek thought, in particular to Aristotle. However, Cassin goes on to emphasize Arendt’s 
harsh critique of the false political claims of the philosophical orthodoxy in major twentieth 
century philosophers as well as her explicit denunciation of political philosophy as such; 
this interpretive stance constitutes the leading thread of her questioning contrary to Eliane 
Escoubas’ effort to reveal a political core in Heidegger – e.g. in his Parmenides course – by 
relating it to the European and world history contemporary to it (Escoubas 1987). While 
claiming to be a political theorist Arendt brings to light a phenomenological reception of 
classical tradition on the grounds of political praxis. In this light, contrary to Heidegger’s 
standard argument on the inauthenticity of the Roman experience Cassin takes as a starting 
point Arendt’s leading interpretation in The Life of the Mind and in other writings, where she 
adopts a positive hermeneutic standpoint on the “Roman experience” as an intrinsically 
political experience in terms different from those of the Greek world. 
This is also without any doubt the most critical point of divergence from Heidegger’s approach 
to this issue. In fact, the absolute independence of “the political” in the Latin world from “the 
political” in Greek thought is, nevertheless, far remote from Heidegger: “The political, which 
as πολιτικόν arise formerly out of the essence of the Greek πόλις, has come to be understood 
in the Roman way. Since the time of the Imperium, the Greek word “political” has meant 
something Roman. What is Greek about it now is only its sound” (Heidegger 1998, p. 45). 
For Arendt, the “Roman trinity” of religio-traditio-auctoritas to which she dedicates several 
remarkable analyses cannot be perceived as an (inauthentic) transposition or translation of the 
“Greek experience” as such and cannot be reduced to it, therefore the Roman imperium is the 
result of the experience of foundation than of an exercice of power (potestas).12 But the Roman 
experience, which is essentially an experience of foundation, is an irreversible reality and a 
landmark for modern Europe: “We can at least listen to the Romans; we can hear them, with 
Arendt, alongside the Greeks – two fundamental experiences which do not form a sequence, 
two irreductible events. We need no longer think of the Romans, with Heidegger, as following 
the Greeks, a mere running out” (Cassin 1990, p. 38). Contrary to Heidegger, what is genuine 
in the Presocratic inception of philosophy is not theoretical αλήθεια, originary truth, but 
political freedom. Parmenides, understood in this sense, would not be a part of the Presocratic 
or Preplatonic philosophical “moment”, as he too belongs to the philosophical tradition which 
separated philosophical from political life, βίος θεωρητικός from βίος πρακτικός. In this sense, 
Arendt is closer to Patočka than to Heidegger in the way she perceives “the Greek moment”, as 
1981, p. 85; Arendt’s emphasis). 
11  Cf. indicatively: Dastur 1993, pp. 185-219; Chiereghin 1993, 197-224; Gasché 2009, pp. 124-143.
12  “To the Romans, at least, the conquest of Italy and the building of an empire were legitimate to the extent that 
the conquered territories enlarged the foundation of the city and remained tied to it” (Arendt 1963, p. 201). On the 




for her too the breach between the Greek inception and the beginning of philosophy is set not 
by θεωρία but by political πράξις for which Socrates, not Plato, would serve as the ideal type. 
Cassin goes on to thematize the Greek conception of “the political” along with Socrates, but 
also the Sophists and tragic poets and concludes stressing Arendt’s emphasis on the political 
versus the philosophical and on freedom and judgment against theoretical knowledge and 
truth criticizing Heidegger’s apoliticism as responsible for his depreciation of a whole European 
tradition which emerges in ancient Roman, a tradition endowed with an eminently political 
character. For Cassin, who follows Arendt on this issue, it is Heidegger’s transposition of the 
Greek πόλις/Roman res publica couple into the original/derivative or authentic/inauthentic 
binary oppositions of αλήθεια/rectitudo which testifies mostly his apoliticism (Cassin 1990, p. 
48).13 On the whole, Cassin identifies the common themes shared by the two thinkers: their idea 
of a philosophical tradition which should be liberated from pure scholasticism and examined 
anew in a phenomenological light; the need for phenomenological attention as to the way the 
past summons us; the importance of logos for politics with regard to its Greek beginning. She 
also, nevertheless, recognizes their profound disagreement as to many critical issues in light 
of the relation of philosophy to politics, of truth to freedom. In this respect, a questionable 
conclusion in Cassin’s analysis is her conviction that “the reaction against Latinity and the 
concern for the Greek origin hidden beneath the translation is certainly one of the elements 
in Arendt’s attitude to the past” (Cassin 1990, p. 35).14 For us, this is clearly a Heideggerian 
twist of Arendt’s analysis, which in all her texts, and especially in those we will see closer in a 
while, speaks in favor of the autonomy of the “Roman answer” vis-as-vis the “Greek answer”. 
But also within Arendt’s dichotomy between the pre-philosophic, that is the proto-political, 
and the philosophic “Greek answer” Cassin sees the in-between that Socrates represent for the 
Greek polis, which is intrinsically non philosophical, that is, idealistic and Platonic, but political, 
that is, pluralist, “doxic” and sophistic. In opposition to the middle Heidegger’s ontologizing 
reading of the Greek polis – rendered explicit also in his interpretation of Greek tragedy – Cassin 
discovers in Arendt a fundamental claim: “Hence politics is essentially a politics of appearance; 
and Greek politics speaks the language of the sophists and deploys all its possibilities: plurality, 
the space of appearances, persuasion, judgement” (Cassin 1990, p. 47).
 
Eliane Escoubas, on the other hand, starts with recognizing the intrinsically phenomenological 
tenure of both Heidegger’s and Arendt’s reflection on the question “Who are we?” in contrast to 
the question “What are we?”.15 Arendt structures her idea of public space in terms of explosition 
which is of the order of an appearing (Erscheinen). Escoubas questions further what Arendt 
means as the “Greek answer” focusing on The Human Condition. The key concept of Arendt’s 
analysis is the Greek term “athanatizein”, which she places at the heart of her reflection on 
Greek politics.16 But classical Greek philosophy does not belong to the eventful character of 
13  Here Cassin takes as a point of criticism Heidegger’s consecutive interpretations of Sophocles’ Antigone, also in the 
Parmenides course.
14  Cassin elaborates further the Greek/Roman dichotomy with regard to Arendt’s differentiation between Greek 
“agonistic” politics and Roman “imitative” politics (Cassin 1990, p. 37). See also on this issue: Euben 2000, pp. 151-164.
15  “Question du qui – question du Dasein : une même question chez Arendt et chez Heidegger ? Une question, en tout 
cas, enracinée dans le “phénoménologique” en tant que le mode de l’apparaître. Exposition (disclosure – Enthüllung) 
chez Arendt, apparaître (Erscheinen) chez Heidegger sont ainsi le fondement de la Wer-Frage : ce fondement est 
phénoménologique. Dans l’exposition et l’apparaître s’élabore la ‘solution des Grecs’…” (Escoubas 1991, p. 56; Escoubas’ 
emphasis).
16  “Lieu de la liberté, la polis est le lieu de l’ ‘évènement’ ; de ce qui surgit sous la triple forme du ‘nouveau’, de 
l’ ‘imprevisible’ et de l’ ‘insaisissable’ […] inscrivant les évènements dans la mémoire comme lieu d’exposition, il 




the polis anymore.17 The hesitation vis-à-vis the political of classical Greek thought is on the 
one side of a discontinuous evolution, whereas the Roman city-state stands on the other: if 
for the “pre-philosophical” (pre-Platonic), essentially political, world the political was of the 
order of the eventful, the event par excellence so to speak, the substitution of the originary triad 
of plurality-speech-action by the Roman triad authority-religion-tradition makes of politics 
a homogeneous and predictable process; at the same time, Greek citizenship is substituted 
by the urbanitas, that is, by a place – the patria – to which everything must go back to and 
therefore patria is not polis.18 Escoubas links here Arendt’s interpretation of the gap between 
Athens and Rome as to the nature of the political to Heidegger’s equation of the imperium 
romanum to a kind of commandment (Befehl) so that they both accept, even though in different 
terms, the “Roman answer” as a prefuguration of modernity.19
Another critical issue to raise with regard to Arendt’s relation to Heidegger with regard to 
philosophy and politics is the presence in them of the Aristotelian praxis/poiesis dichotomy. 
Phenomenologists such as Jacques Taminiaux have tempted a comparative reading of Arendt 
and Heidegger on this basis. For Taminiaux, Arendt’s political thought reads Aristotelian praxis 
in light of Kant’s theory of judgment, leaving thus Plato alone to confront the accusation of 
apoliticism. Taminiaux interprets Heidegger’s phenomenological reading of Aristotelian ethics 
in light of Arendt’s labor-work-action triad, thus, introducing a series of critical questions and 
aporias in the ongoing discussion on the relation of philosophy and politics in them.20 Contrary 
to Taminiaux’s argument, others, such as Dana Vila, refute the importance of this dichotomy 
for the formation of her political thought and doubts the significance of its phenomenological 
background.21 Last but not least, phenomenologists, such as Peg Birmingham, deny the 
unconditional chasm of natality in Arendt and being-towards-death in Heidegger, thus, 
proposing a new reading of several phenomenological themes in Being and Time which suggest 
an insight into natality and being-toward-birth in Heidegger too.22 
Let us now move beyond these standard references to Arendt’s major works in order to seek 
for answers to the question of Europe’s double origin from the viewpoint of less known early 
(history), est aussi le lieu ou les actions et les paroles constitutives de l’exposition du qui se reinscrivent dans des 
paroles, dans d’autres paroles: dans des histoires racontées (stories)…” (Arendt 1983, p. 59).
17  “…avec Platon, selon Arendt, le theme lexico-pratique en lieu dans la polis cède la place à un thème psycho-théorique 
qui est, en quelque sorte, apolitique; en quelque sorte, car on peut dire que Platon congédie le politique et cela ressemble 
beaucoup à la façon dont Platon congédie la poésie), ou bien qu’avec Platon le politique prend une autre tournure” 
(Arendt 1983, p. 58; Escoubas’ emphasis). On the notion of event and its importance for Arendt’s thought:Taminiaux 1984. 
18  “L’imitation est le mode d’augmentation de la fondation et le caractère politique du romain devient l’urbanitas. 
L’urbanitas prend la place du bios politikos et, en même temps, l’imitation induit une visée d’universalité, de sorte que le 
politique romain se décline urbi et orbi” (Escoubas 1991, p. 67 ; Escoubas’ emphasis).
19  “Les Romains n’ouvrent-ils pas alors la porte à la modernité, avec, comme Arendt l’analyse, la substitution du 
comportement à l’action et la substitution du processus à l’évènement – en fin de compte, avec la substitution du social au 
politique?...” (ibid, p. 95 ; Escoubas’ emphasis).
20  See in particular J. Taminiaux’s analysis in La fille de Thrace et le penseur professionnel. Arendt et Heidegger, op.cit. 
Taminiaux reads Arendt’s analyses in The Human Condition and elsewhere as replies to Heidegger’s appropriation of 
the Greeks in the period where his fundamental ontology was shaped, a key example being his course on the Sophist 
(Taminiaux 1992, p. 25). See also a series of shorter studies such as Taminiaux 1985. 
21  “Arendt, then, describes freedom, rather than the good life, as the raison d’être of politics; she identifies the 
initiatory dimension of action as the chief locus of freedom; and she sees virtuosity of performance as its primary 
manifestation. When combined, these aspects suggest that Arendt’s view of action is more than a little different from 
Aristotle’s” (Vila 1996, p. 45). 
22  “Although largely ignored by readers of both Heidegger and Arendt, Heidegger’s notion of being-toward-birth, 
particularly when thought through his discussion of Fürsorge, offers a corrective to Arendt’s discussion of natality” 




but equally important texts of hers, such as her 1950s preparatory notes for a never written 
Introduction to Politics (Arendt 1995). Jacques Taminiaux is to our knowledge one of the few who 
have thematized the Athens/Rome dichotomy in Arendt from the viewpoint of the drafts of 
her 1950s draft writing (Taminiaux 2000).
Here Arendt sets out posing a dramatic event of European, also of world, history, that is the 
threat of a nuclear war or of what she calls “total war” (guerre totale), that is a war which 
leads to a disequilibrium between the force of production and the force of destruction: “Les 
instruments de violence necessaries a la destruction sont crees pour ainsi dire a l’image 
des instruments de production et l’arsenal technique de chaque époque les englobe tous 
deux de la meme maniere […] Mais le pouvoir de detruire et le pouvoir de produire ne 
s’equilibrent pas toujours de facon parfaite” (Arendt 1995, p. 126). On another occasion she 
admits rather superficially that this war is not the offspring of Europe, but that of America, 
which is in a certain sense non-European, still serious doubts could be raised against this 
claim (Arendt 1958, pp. 578-580).23 Through a remarkable analysis of what she designates 
as a process of annihilation Arendt comes to differentiate Europe’s previous World Wars 
– but also totalitarian regimes though it is their offspring, from the rise of a new reality 
introduced on a world scale by nuclear power (Arendt 1995, p. 131). In nuclear war Arendt 
sees the accomplishment of a process prefigured in WWII, that is, the complete annihilation 
of the defeated, a process that is intrinsically non-political, as it bursts open the limits of 
the political in an unprecedented way, even in totalitarian regimes. What makes of this 
new reality – European or planetary (in Heidegger’s terms)/post-European (in Patočka’s 
terms) – a non-political reality? It is the absence or superflousness of negotiations and the 
return to “brute” existence. Violent annihilation is aimed at the murder of one or many 
individual existences, but of something that is potentially immortal, also at the destitution 
not of particulars productive means, but at the extermination of a whole historico-political 
reality. It is in the context of a harsh critique of today’s European – or driven by the European 
mode of knowledge and production – reality that Arendt poses the origin of the political in 
the Romans so as to circumscribe its destitution by a “surpassing of the limits inherent in 
violent action” proper to politics in the Atomic age.24 If contemporary Europe ends up in the 
destitution of the political – inaugurated by totalitarianism and exacerbated by the reality 
of the “total war” – its beginning is a political one. It is here that Arendt turns to another 
glorified war, the Trojean War. Contrary to other systematic analyses of classical political 
thought, Arendt builds a bridge between Home and Cicero, archaic Greek and Roman res 
publica in order to ask the vital question: “Was the Trojean War a war of annihilation just 
like contemporary, actual or potential, total wars?” (Arendt 1995, p. 137). I would like to 
delve into Arendt’s brilliant analysis of the way in which the Greek polis instaures politics 
through an exclusion of the possibility of annihilation, such as the Trojean war, and also of the 
cultivation of a special discerning ability, which makes Arendt approach Aristotle’s φρόνιμος 
to Kant’s critique of judgment. Nevertheless, it is not the Greek but the Roman instauration 
of the political – as a re-instauration of Troy by the Romans, the descendants of the Trojans 
(Ennead) – that determines fully what belongs to the realm of the political and what lies 
outside it. The determining factor, which marks also the difference between the Greek and 
the Roman-modern experience of the political is the negation of violence through alliance 
23  See on this issue: Sylvie Courtine-Denamy, “Préface”, in Arendt (1995), pp. 16-17.
24  “Ce qui en principe depuis les Romains, et de fait depuis les trois ou quatre derniers siècles que nous appelons 
l’époque moderne, paraissait impossible, parce que cela ne s’était plus produit au coeur du monde civilisé, à savoir 
l’extermination de peuples entiers et le fait de rayer de la surface de la terre des civilizations tout entières, était 
réapparu d’un seul coup comme une menace dans la sphère du possible-trop possible” (Arendt 1995, p. 133).
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and contract (pacte) conceived as a transformative practice, a “consensus omnium” which ends 
up in the creation of the new, that is, of new relations between individuals and peoples. The 
central importance of contract at the Roman beginning of Europe is intrinsically linked to 
another phenomenon, that of the law (lex). Here, in complete disagreement with Heidegger’s 
conjunction of lex and imperium, Arendt envisages the Roman law as a factor of novelty, of 
creating bonds between people under conditions of plurality and exchange of λόγοι.25 
Thus, contrary to Heidegger, Arendt opts for the superiority of the “Roman” over the Greek to 
the extent that the former satisfies the two conditions of possibility for the emergence of the 
political, that is, human plurality and noverty. In this respect, Arendt interprets the oppositional 
couple νόμος (nomos)-lex on the background of her poiesis/praxis opposition, where the Greek 
νόμος succumbs to the model of production, whereas Roman lex to the pluralistic model of praxis. 
The Roman law, on the contrary, is “praxical” in its very essence, as it opens up a new political 
space through the contract between people: if for Heidegger the Roman imperium is metaphysical 
through and through – the essential prefiguration of all modern “epochal” principles ending up 
to Nietzsche’s will to power – for Arendt the imperium is the actual realization of Roman law as 
the enduring creation of new bonds of alliance and association. In this sense, what for Heidegger 
lies at the heart of the Roman beginning, that is expansionism and will to domination, is for 
Arendt nothing but a late derivative of its initial impetus to a pax romana, as she challenges 
Heidegger’s claim about the Roman imperium as a manifestation of a will to domination. 
Arendt often plays Greek against Roman politics insisting that the political is founded 
upon a unique type of experience, which is not that of truth, but of freedom not as a means 
for political ends but as being intrinsically political, which is for her a unique Roman 
achievement. Considered in a different light, if Greek νόμος is ontological in its essence – in 
Reiner Schürmann’s beautiful terms of law’s tragic “double bind” – as it is always relevant 
to a limit and to its (non)transgression, Roman lex is intrinsically political, always inscribed 
within a networks of relations and aims at creating or recreating new ones. This is particularly 
important because Europe is born out of this process of alliances in terms of foreign policy, the 
field in which the Romans prevailed in what Arendt designates as the “Roman politicization of 
space” (Arendt 1995, p. 171). Arendt plays here also on the opposition couple “world/desert” 
in order to illustrate the properly political essence of the Roman imperium and its modern 
European descendants: the Roman lex should not be conceived in terms of domination and 
power, but in terms of a possibility to open up a world, that is a space of plurality suitable 
for human action. In twentieth century Europe, totalitarianism and its outcomes – the 
most dangerous being the threat of a total war – transgresses the law in the sense that it 
reintroduces violence into the public space in a “deworlding” manner. Thus, the power of 
History as a supra-individual which fabricates facts as a solitary artisan in the name of a 
unique metaphysical truth threats to put human plurality, freedom and politics aside thus 
instauring the “law of the desert”(ibid.).26 
It is at this point where the transition from the Roman to the modern becomes possible that 
Arendt situates Augustine. Her late treatment of his philosophy and theology comes, quite 
naturally, as a supplement to her 1929 dissertation on Augustine’s concept of love, where the 
25  “…la lex romaine, à la différence et même au contraire de ce que les Grecs entendaient par nomos, signifie 
proprement “un lien durable” et tout de suite après le pacte, aussi bien dans le droit public que dans le droit privé” 
(Arendt 1995, p. 157).
26  Arendt affirms this deworlding effect in her diagnosis of totalitarianism. In The Human Condition it is linked to the 
triad labor-work-action as totalitarian regimes’ insistance upon labor and their degradation of work and action leads 




whole conceptual framework for this treatment, but in more general terms, for her treatment 
of the political as such is set.27 Let us for the moment confine ourselves to her 1950s treatment 
of the Christian-Augustinian moment in relation to the rise of modernity. Strictly speaking, this 
“moment” is situated in the strict continuity of the Roman experience of the political. In terms 
similar to those of the Romans Augustine formulates the “world” as a public space, therefore 
the Christian experience of freedom is not that of detachment, as in the case of the Greek 
philosophers and it is on this occasion that plays Plato against Augustine.28 Christian politics 
from Saint Augustine and to medieval Europe always secured a religiously predetermined 
public space, where the role of the political was endowed with much ambiguity. What has 
changed between the roman-medieval and the modern era as to the status of the political is the 
equilibrium between the public and the private, that is the privatization of religious experience, 
and the rise of new spheres of human activity, such as economy. 
Last but not least, a critical approach to Arendt’s understanding of the “Greek” and the 
“Roman answer” and of their role in the formation of modern Europe is once more Reiner 
Schürmann’s account of it in his Broken Hegemonies. His analysis is impregnated with both 
Arendt’s – and Heidegger’s – views of Athens and Rome. Schürmann borrows the “double 
bind” structure of his epochal principles from Arendt’s theme of natality and Heidegger’s 
“being-towards-death”, thus affirming their necessary belong together. Arendt’s questioning 
of the “principle of beginnings” is present here along with her double principle of natality 
and mortality: “It had seemed to me that the most obvious and the least thetic beginnings 
are marked when one natural language yields to another in our history. Everything begins 
differently when we change language. The topoi of which the topology takes inventory are 
then the Greek, the Latin, and the modern vernacular sites from out of which philosophy has 
spoken” (Schürmann 2003, p. 348).29 Though Schürmann acknowledges the middle Heidegger’s 
elaboration of the institution-destitution of metaphysical epochs, which he designates as 
a topology which is both recapulative and critical (Schürmann 2003, pp. 554-558), and as a 
“phenomenological ultimate”, he nevertheless incorporates a great deal of Arendt’s account of 
the labour-work-action triad in Western politics and history: “At its Greek apogee, philosophy 
was astonished by what the hands could accomplish. Since Aristotle, fabrication had remained 
the key phenomenon, the observation of which furnished the schemes for all branches of 
knowledge. Beginning with Latin philosophy, the great beginners were astonished by another 
making – by the cosmopolitan republic, unique in history and so obviously crowned with 
success” (Schürmann 2003, p. 261). In this context, Augustine is shown along with Cicero to 
illustrate the Latin “hegemonic fantasm” so as to set the continuity between the Roman and 
the Christian epochal regimes. But what is proper to Augustine’s Christian “Latinity”? Here 
Schürmann admits his reliance upon Arendt’s reading of Augustine while criticizing at the 
same time her lack of awareness of the epochal “double bind” inherent in it:
As Hannah Arendt analyzed it so well, the heavenly city in gestation on earth does not 
meet up with existing societies that are gathered together under a body of consensual 
laws so at to temper and make up for a plurality of interests […] Arendt, however, does 
27  Ronald Beiner argues that, against the commonly held opinion that Arendt’s preoccupation with the notion of 
world comes from her personal experiences of the war and totalitarianism, the roots of this problematic goes back to 
her 1929 doctoral thesis on Augustine (Beiner 1996, pp. 269-284).
28  On Augustine as a philosopher of natality and, in this sense, a strictly non-Greek philosopher: Arendt 1981, pp. 
109-110.




not allow herself to the institutive gesture through which Augustine endows nature-as-
law with normative attributes; it is a focusing that fixes, in large scale, the parallel city, 
the only city that conforms to this law (Schürmann 2003, p. 256).30
An obvious question to ask is what would be the philosophical importance of raising the 
question of Europe’s origins in today’s situation of crisis. A first answer would point out 
Europe’s need to re-activate its myths, cultural and political, in order to survive the current 
crisis.31 In this respect, Arendt’s phenomenology of political poses a serious challenge to 
today’s tendencies of reducing history to labour, which seriously harm the perspectives of 
Europe’s political future. Europe has always identified itself to a process of self-awareness 
which is mainly defined in terms of an internal critique. It is in this sense that a positive 
and constructive questioning on Europe’s present and future needs to raise the question of 
Europe’s origins, that is the question of what is proper to it (Crépon 2006, pp. 79-95). What 
makes Arendt’s analysis powerful for today’s European crisis is the centrality of “the political” 
as what constitutes the very essence of the European identity. In this sense, the intertwining 
of “the Greek” and “the Roman” has to be constantly reactivated in order for European politics 
not to be deprived of its foundations. 
What would a discourse on Europe’s founding narratives, which are no doubt not only Greek 
and Roman, but also Christian and Enlightenment-based, have to contribute to the on-going 
European crisis? The latter is most often perceived as a financial crisis shaking the very 
existence of Europe, in the figure of the EU, as an economic entity (Shore 2000). Accounts 
of European identity, mainly those produced by contemporary phenomenology (Husserl, 
Heidegger, Arendt, among others) or hermeneutics (Gadamer) – are often accused to indulge 
in the promotion of a “thick” cultural identity, which eventually succumbs to two major 
fallacies: the “historicist” and the “culturalist” fallacy. The former type of fallacy would consist 
in arguing that “we should always find in the past the correct recipe to face current problems 
and challenges”, whereas the “culturalist” fallacy would consist in reducing “the legitimacy 
of a political body to its presumed homogeneous, cultural identity” (Bottici 2013, p. 29). 
However, there are more than one ways to envisage cultural identity in terms of a challenge 
to construct a new common identity suitable for the multinational entity that Europe is at 
present. In order to do this, it would be imperative to detach Europe’s Greek and Roman 
founding narratives from their boundaries within sovereign nation-states and resituate within 
a broader and inclusive cultural space. In this sense, the phenomenological discourse on 
the origins of Europe wouldn’t be perceived as the reductive endeavor to identify a unique, 
unchanged, and ultimately exclusive principle determining the common European identity 
in terms of identity/difference or authenticity/inauthenticity, but in the terms of what Marc 
Crepon claims about Europe being the “product of a dream”, that is the product of an infinitely 
“renewable self-differentiation” (autodifférenciation renouvelée).32 Hannah Arendt is one of 
the few thinkers who have dared a profound reflection on the properly political identity of 
Europe, therefore her reflections on the political could serve the purpose of constructing a 
republican model of Europe based on the formation of a common European political culture 
without reducing the political definition of Europe as a supranational entity to a set of cultural 
30  Here Schürmann refers to Arendt’s doctoral thesis on Love and Saint Augustine.
31  See in this respect: Bottici & Challand 2013.
32  “L’Europe est le produit d’un rêve qui n’a jamais été celui d’une identité à soi ou d’un repli sur soi, mais d’une 
autodifférenciation, renouvelée, à chaque étape de son histoire, par la critique de chacune de ses compositions” 




discourse of its culturally significant core-nations (Passerini 2003). A discourse on the origins 
is not necessarily a reductive discourse of sameness and difference, as origins can also be 
differentiating, as in the case of “the Greek” and “the Roman” in their co-belonging and 
mutual exclusion: “…the singular and seemingly proper name of Europe is a name that comes 
to Europe from somewhere other than itself; as such it designates a still indeterminate and 
obscure part of the world where the sun sets. It is the name for a region or a thing that still 
remains, and will perhaps forever remain, indeterminate” (Gasché 2009, pp. 13-14). Europe’s 
indeterminate or differentiating identity could prove an important contribution to the current 
debates on the rescuing of the European project. Questions of authority and legitimacy should 
be envisaged in light of their roots within Europe’s own genealogy and not solely within an 
instrumental or procedural perspective. Consequently, “political Europe” is as much as needed 
as its origins should be activated as a part of a comprehensive “European social imaginary” 
as a space of common cultural and historical significance independent from existing national 
cultural and historical narratives. 
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